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Abstract
Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners (NQSS) are key distribution protocols in which
Alice encodes her key into N − 1 qubits, in such a way that all the other partners must cooperate in
order to retrieve the key. On these protocols, several eavesdropping scenarios are possible: some partners
may want to reconstruct the key without the help of the other ones, and consequently collaborate with
an Eve that eavesdrops on the other partners’ channels. For each of these scenarios, we give the optimal
individual attack that the Eve can perform. In case of such an optimal attack, the authorized partners
have a higher information on the key than the unauthorized ones if and only if they can violate a Bell’s
inequality.
1 Introduction
In the rapidly growing field of quantum information, the first protocol that has almost reached the level of
application is quantum cryptography [1], a beautiful solution to the important problem of secure communi-
cation. The authorized partners Alice and Bob can establish an absolutely secure communication provided
that they share a common sequence of bits (the key), unknown to anybody else: this is the very principle
of the so-called secret-key cryptographic schemes. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [2] proposed a way of
distributing the key in a physically secure way by using quantum physics: their protocol bears the acronym
BB84, and was the first protocol of quantum cryptography — from now on, we shall use the more precise
name of quantum key distribution (QKD). In the intuition of Bennett and Brassard, security is provided by
the well-known feature of quantum mechanics: ”measurement perturbs the system”; or, under a different
viewpoint which is equivalent, by the no-cloning theorem. In 1991, Ekert [3] proposed a QKD protocol that
uses entangled particles, and stated that the violation of Bell’s inequality might be the physical principle
that ensures security. This view was challenged by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [4], who showed that
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Ekert’s protocol is actually equivalent to the BB84 protocol, that involves single particles. A link between
security of QKD and Bell’s inequalities was nevertheless noticed in further studies [5, 6].
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we consider two-partners QKD. The material of this
section is not new in itself, but the approach is; moreover, it is a useful introduction to the following
Sections. In Section 3, we define the N-partners protocols that we consider. Several eavesdropping scenarios
can be imagined on these protocols, and we give Eve’s optimal individual attack in each case. In Section
4, we introduce a family of M-qubit Bell’s inequalities (Mermin-Klyshko inequalities), and we discuss the
link between the violation of these inequalities and the security of the N-partners protocol. Section 5 is a
conclusion.
2 QKD involving two partners
2.1 The BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution between two partners, Alice and Bob, is characterized by
the fact that two complementary bases are used to encode the bits. In the original version of the BB84
protocol [2], Alice prepares a qubit into a randomly chosen eigenstate of σx or of σy , and sends it to Bob.
Since we want to discuss Bell’s inequalities, we consider the following preparation method [4]: Alice has
an EPR source that produces a maximally entangled state, say |Φ+z 〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉), where |0〉 and |1〉
are the eigenstates of σz . On her side, Alice measures randomly σx or σy on one qubit. The moment at
which Alice performs her measurement is irrelevant; in particular, she can measure her qubit immediately
after it leaves the source. This way, Alice’s measurement acts as a preparation of the second qubit, which
goes to Bob through a quantum channel. Bob also measures either σx or σy . If he measures the same
observable as Alice, his result is perfectly correlated to hers, since 〈σx ⊗ σx〉Φ+ = −〈σy ⊗ σy〉Φ+ = 1; if he
measures the other observable, he has no information on Alice’s result, since 〈σx⊗σy〉Φ+ = 〈σy⊗σx〉Φ+ = 0.
At the end of the transmission, for each qubit Alice and Bob reveal publicly the measurement that they
performed (but of course not its result). They simply discard those cases where they have measured different
observables, and they end up with two identical lists of random bits. Bob’s information on Alice’s bits is
measured by the mutual information I(A : B), defined as H(A)+H(B)−H(AB) = H(A)−H(A|B), where
H({pi}) = −
∑
i pilog2pi is the Shannon entropy. Therefore, in the absence of eavesdropping, H(A|B) = 0
since knowing the list of B is equivalent to knowing the list of A; and since Alice is supposed to choose her
measurement randomly, H(A) = 1; whence I(A : B) = 1, as it should.
2.2 Security and mutual information
The security of a key-distribution protocol based on quantum mechanics comes from the no-cloning theo-
rem. Suppose that Eve tries to eavesdrop on the quantum channel linking Alice and Bob: she cannot get
information on the state that is sent on the channel without introducing perturbations, that should reveal
her presence to the authorized partners. If A and B observe the presence of the spy, in most cases they can
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still perform some operations that ultimately lead them to share a secret key. More precisely [7] A and B
can run a one-way protocol known as privacy amplification if and only if
I(A : B) > min[I(A : E), I(B : E)] . (1)
This is the condition that we ask for security. In fact, it has been shown that this condition is not strictly
necessary: even if it does not hold, there exist a protocol allowing the extraction of a secret key [8]. But
this protocol, called advantage distillation, is a two-way protocol, much less efficient than one-way privacy
amplification.
The natural problem is now: for a given error rate that is introduced on Bob’s information, that is, for a given
value of I(A : B), find the attack of Eve that optimizes her information on Alice’s key, I(A : E). The answer
is not known in all generality; but it is, if we restrict the analysis to individual attacks [6]. This means that
Eve acts separately on each qubit that is sent on the quantum channel, i.e., she does not perform coherent
measurements of subsequent qubits. To date, it is not known whether a more general attack would be more
efficient, only bounds are known [9] — as for the experimental state-of-the-art, even the implementation of
individual attacks would be a great challenge.
It has been shown [10] that Eve can perform the optimal individual attack having a single qubit as resource,
by implementing the following unitary transformation affecting her and Bob’s qubits (by convention, we
supposed that Eve prepares her qubit in the state |0〉):
UBE|00〉 = |00〉
UBE|10〉 = cosφ|10〉 + sinφ|01〉
(2)
where |00〉 etc. are shorthand for |0〉B ⊗ |0〉E etc.; φ ∈ [0, pi2 ] characterizes the strength of Eve’s attack. Note
that the roles of B and E are symmetric under the exchange of φ with pi2 − φ. Due to eavesdropping, the
three-qubit state of A, B and E reads
|Ψ21(φ)〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ cosφ|110〉+ sinφ|101〉) . (3)
(the labeling means that we consider a 2-partners protocol in which 1 partner is spied by Eve). By tracing out
one of the qubits, we obtain the density matrices ρAB, ρAE and ρBE that describe the statistics of each pair.
Let thenM,N ∈ {A,B,E},M 6= N , be two of the three partners. We want to calculate I(M : N). In general,
we must consider two statistics: the statistics px obtained when M and N measure σx, and the statistics py
obtained when M and N measure σy; and I(M : N) = 1− 12 [Hx(M |N)+Hy(M |N)]. Here, after calculation
one finds that both statistics are the same, whatever the pair. Moreover, p(M = 0, N = 0) = p(M = 1, N =
1) and p(M = 0, N = 1) = p(M = 1, N = 0). Writing DMN = p(M = 0, N = 1) + p(M = 1, N = 0) the
probability that the bit of M is different from the bit of N , we find finally
I(M : N) = 1−H({DMN , 1−DMN}) (4)
with
DAB =
1−cosφ
2 , DAE =
1−sinφ
2 , DBE =
1−sin 2φ
2 . (5)
In figure 1, we plotted I(A : B) versus min[I(A : E), I(B : E)]: we see that the condition for security (1) is
fulfilled if and only if φ ≤ pi4 .
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2.3 Violation of a Bell’s inequality
Having the three density matrices ρAB, ρAE and ρBE derived from the three-qubit state (3), we can also
investigate whether one or more pairs violate a Bell’s inequality for a given value of φ. Given a set of four
unit vectors a = {~a1,~a ′1,~a2,~a ′2}, we build the two-qubit Bell operator
B2(a) =
(
σa1 + σa′1
)⊗ σa2 +
(
σa1 − σa′1
)⊗ σa′
2
(6)
with σa = ~a · ~σ. The CHSH inequality [11] reads S2 = maxa Tr(ρB2(a)) ≤ 2, while the maximal value
allowed by QM is S2 = 2
√
2 [12]. The calculation of S2 using the Horodecki criterion [13] can be carried out
explicitly for the three pairs, and we find
SAB = 2
√
2 cosφ , SAE = 2
√
2 sinφ , SBE =
√
2 sin 2φ . (7)
Therefore the pair A-B violate the inequality if and only if the pair A-E does not violate it, and the curves
cross at φ = pi4 , exactly were the security condition ceases to be fulfilled (fig. 1). As for the pair B-E, it never
violates the inequality. The fact that the curves SAB and SAE cross at φ =
pi
4 is an immediate consequence
of the symmetry of the attack (2); but what is interesting is that they cross precisely for SAB = SAE = 2.
In other words: simply using the symmetry, we could have guessed that I(A : B) > I(A : E) if and only if
SAB > SAE ; but here we found that Eve’s optimal attack is such that A and B can establish a secret key
using one-way privacy amplification iff SAB > 2, i.e., iff they violate the CHSH inequality. This coincidence
was already stressed in [5, 6].
It has recently been shown that the analysis of the BB84 protocol holds unchanged even if we suppose that
Eve controls the source [14]. Also, in the case of the six-state protocol for QKD [15], the violation of CHSH
is still a sufficient, but no longer a necessary condition. In conclusion, a tour d’horizon of the two-partners
QKD protocols with qubits shows that the violation of the CHSH inequality is a sufficient condition for
security. In Section 4, we generalize this statement to protocols in which the key is distributed among more
than two partners. The next section is devoted to the definition of these protocols.
3 QKD involving N partners: definition, and eavesdropping
3.1 The N-partners secret-sharing protocol
The QKD protocol can be generalized to more than two partners in several ways. For instance, one may
think of a protocol in which Alice sends information to Bob and Charlie so that she can choose a posteriori
with whom a secret key will be established. Here we consider another family of protocols, based on the
following idea: Alice sends information to her N − 1 partners B1, ..., BN−1 in such a way that all of them
must cooperate in order to retrieve the secret key, and any smaller subset of Bobs has no information on
the key. More formally, this means that the bipartite mutual information I(A : B1, ..., Bk) must be 0 for
k < N − 1, and 1 for k = N − 1. Such protocols exist, and are called secret-sharing protocols [16].
Now, take k+1 of the partners and divide the partners into three non-empty groups A, B and C. In general,
it holds I(A : BC) = I(AB : C) + H(B|C) − H(B|A). But in the protocols that we are considering, if we
4
Measure of A Result State of BC
σx + ≡ 0 |02〉x
− ≡ 1 |12〉x
σy + ≡ 0 |02〉y
− ≡ 1 |12〉y
Table 1: Preparation of the state of BC by measurements of A.
know only A, we have no information on B, since we lack the information of C; thus H(B|A) = H(B).
Similarly, H(B|C) = H(B). Consequently for secret-sharing protocols we have I(A : BC) = I(AB : C) =
I(A : B1, ..., Bk).
The quantum version of a secret sharing protocol involving N partners (NQSS) goes as follows: Alice’s
source produces the N-qubit GHZ state |GHZN 〉 = 1√2 (|0N 〉z + |1N〉z), with |0N〉z = |0〉z ⊗ ... ⊗ |0〉z, and
|1N〉z = |1〉z ⊗ ... ⊗ |1〉z. Alice measures σx or σy on one of the qubits, and sends the other qubits to her
partners B1, ..., BN−1. Each Bob also measures either σx or σy. At the end of the transmission, all partners
communicate publicly their measurements. Each time that an even number of partners have measured σy,
the results exhibit the desired correlation. In fact, consider a measurement where all partners measured σx:
each partner has one bit sA, sB1 , ..., sBN−1, where s = ±1. Since 〈σx ⊗ ...⊗ σx〉GHZ = 1, these N bits must
satisfy sAsB1 ...sBN−1 = 1. Consequently, if all the Bobs cooperate, they know Alice’s bit sA = sB1 ...sBN−1 ;
and if one or more of the Bobs refuses to cooperate, then the other Bobs have strictly no information on
what Alice has sent.
Before studying Eve’s optimal individual attacks on NQSS, we introduce the useful notations
|0N 〉z = |0〉z ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉z , |1N〉z = |1〉z ⊗ ...⊗ |1〉z
|0N 〉x = 1√2 (|0N 〉z + |1N〉z) , |1N〉x = 1√2 (|0N 〉z − |1N 〉z)
|0N 〉y = 1√2 (|0N 〉z + i|1N〉z) , |1N〉y = 1√2 (|0N 〉z − i|1N〉z) .
These notations may seem misleading, since |0N 〉x, |1N〉x, |0N 〉y and |1N〉y are not product states like |0N 〉z
and |1N〉z , but GHZ states. It will become evident in the following why such notations are indeed suited to
our analysis.
3.2 Optimal eavesdropping for 3QSS
For clarity, we discuss in all detail Eve’s attacks in the case N = 3, that is, on the quantum secret shar-
ing protocol proposed in [16]. Alice’s authorized partners are called Bob and Charlie. Two scenarios for
eavesdropping can be imagined.
Scenario 1. An external Eve tries to eavesdrop on both channels A-B and A-C, in order to gain as much
information as possible on Alice’s message. For the analysis of this scenario, it is convenient to suppose that
Alice measures immediately σx or σy on her qubit. This way, she prepares the two-qubit state that is sent to
Bob and Charlie, according to Table 1. If we forget the difference in the physical realization of the flying bit
and stick to the information content of what is being transmitted, this eavesdropping scenario is identical to
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Meas. of A and B Result State of C Meas. of A and B Result State of C
σx ⊗ σx ++ |0〉x σy ⊗ σx ++ |0〉y
+− |1〉x +− |1〉y
−+ |1〉x −+ |1〉y
−− |0〉x −− |0〉y
σx ⊗ σy ++ |0〉y σy ⊗ σy ++ |1〉x
+− |1〉y +− |0〉x
−+ |1〉y −+ |0〉x
−− |0〉y −− |1〉x
Table 2: Preparation of the state of C by measurements of A and B.
the eavesdropping on the BB84 protocol. Therefore we know an individual attack that maximizes I(A : E)
for a given I(A : BC): it is given by (2), replacing |0〉 with |02〉z on Bob’s side. Note that this attack is
”coherent”, in the sense that Eve attacks coherently the two qubits flying to B and C; but is nevertheless
an ”individual” attack, since each pair of qubits is attacked separately form the other pairs. This concludes
the study of scenario 1.
Scenario 2. Bob does not want to cooperate with Charlie in order to retrieve Alice’s message. Consequently,
he collaborates with an Eve that tries to eavesdrop on the line A-C. In this scenario, two triples come into
play: A-B-C and A-B-E, and the meaningful information measures are I(A : BC) and I(A : BE). Just as in
the analysis of scenario 1, it is useful to recast the protocol in the following form: by measuring σx or σy , A
and B prepare the state of the qubit that is sent to C. The preparation is given in Table 2. The bits flying
on the channel A-C are exactly in the same physical state as in a BB84 protocol. The conclusion here is
not as straightforward as for scenario 1 however, because the individual attack (2) optimizes for I(AB : E)
with respect to I(AB : C), while we need the attack that optimizes I(A : BE) with respect to I(A : BC).
But I(AB : C) = I(A : BC) and I(AB : E) = I(A : BE) hold even in the presence of the eavesdropper: in
fact, B and C are not correlated before the eavesdropping, and E is not correlated with A and B; therefore
H(B|A) = H(B|C) = H(B|E) = H(B).
3.3 Optimal eavesdropping for NQSS
The same argument can be worked out for any eavesdropping scenario on NQSS, for arbitrary N . One the
one side, as discussed, even under eavesdropping, it holds that I(AB1...BN−n−1 : BN−n...BN−1) = I(A :
B1...BN−1). On the other side, conditioned to the measurements of σx and σy by N − n partners, the n
other partners can only receive one of the four states |0n〉x, |1n〉x, |0n〉y, |1n〉y. In fact, take as an example
the case where all the N −n partners measure σx. The N-qubit GHZ state |GHZN 〉 can be rewritten as (we
neglect normalization)
|0N 〉z + |1N〉z ≃
(|0〉x + |1〉x
)⊗(N−n)|0n〉z +
(|0〉x − |1〉x
)⊗(N−n)|1n〉z =
= (even number of 1x’s)⊗ |0n〉x + (odd number of 1x’s)⊗ |1n〉x .
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Then, conditioned on the result of the measurement of σx on the first N − n qubits, either |0n〉x or |1n〉x is
sent to the remaining n partners. The case where some of the N − n partners measure σy is analogous; the
states that are prepared are |0n〉x or |1n〉x if an even number of partners measure σy, |0n〉y or |1n〉y otherwise.
In conclusion, we have shown that, for all possible eavesdropping scenarios on NQSS protocols, Eve can
perform the optimal individual attack having a single qubit as resource. The interaction that describes the
optimal individual attack on n channels is
|0n〉z ⊗ |0〉E −→ |0n〉z ⊗ |0〉E
|1n〉z ⊗ |0〉E −→ cosφ|1n〉z ⊗ |0〉E + sinφ|0n〉z ⊗ |1〉E
(8)
where φ ∈ [0, pi2 ] measures the strength of the interaction. Of course, this interaction is presumably more
complicated when she eavesdrops on several channels (like in scenario 1 for 3QSS), since she must have
her qubit interacting coherently with all flying qubits. For the attack (8), the mutual information for the
authorized and for the unauthorized partners, Ia and Iu respectively, can be calculated explicitly; it is not
astonishing that the result is
Ia ≡ I(A : B1, ..., BN−1) = IN=2(A : B) = 1−H({DAB, 1−DAB}) (9)
Iu ≡ I(A : B1, ..., BN−n−1, E) = IN=2(A : E) = 1−H({DAE, 1−DAE}) (10)
with DAB and DAE given by (5). So again by symmetry Ia > Iu if and only if φ <
pi
4 . To our knowledge,
privacy amplification has not been studied in secret-sharing protocols; in particular, it is not clear if there is
still a huge difference in efficiency between ”one-way” and ”two-way” protocols. It seems however obvious
that the set of partners having the highest mutual information can run some protocol to extract a secret
key.
4 Violations of Bell’s inequalities
4.1 Multiqubit Bell’s inequalities
In the case N = 2, we saw that Ia > Iu if and only if the authorized partners violate the CHSH inequality,
that is if Sa > 2 > Su. We extend this result to all NQSS protocols.
The number of inequivalent BI grows rapidly with M , the number of qubits. We restrict to the family
of inequalities obtained when only two measurement are performed on each qubit, which are the natural
generalization of the CHSH inequality. Even with this restriction, the number of possible inequalities grows
as 22
M
; but recently, the inequalities in this family have been completely classified by Werner and Wolf [17].
In particular, these authors have shown that in this family one can find some inequalities that are ”optimal”
under several respects. These optimal inequalities are nothing but the so-called Mermin-Klyshko inequalities
(MKI) proposed some years ago [18, 19]. These are the M -qubit BI that we are going to consider in this
work.
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Let a be a set of 2M unit vectors. The Bell operator that enters the MKI forM qubits is defined recursively
as
BM (a) ≡ BM = 1
2
(σaM + σa′
M
)⊗ BM−1 + 1
2
(σaM − σa′
M
)⊗ B′M−1 (11)
where B′m is obtained from Bm by exchanging all the ~ak and ~a ′k. The maximal value for product states is
〈BM 〉 = 2; quantum correlations allow 〈BM 〉 > 2, up to 〈BM 〉 = 2M+12 , obtained for M-qubit GHZ states.
It is important to stress another property of MKIs [19, 20]. Let ρ be a M-qubit state, and suppose that
you can find a decomposition ρ =
∑
i piρi such that in all ρi at most m < M qubits are entangled (not
necessarily the same ones in each ρi): then 〈BM 〉ρ ≤ 2m+12 . In other words, if 2m2 < 〈BM 〉ρ ≤ 2m+12 , the
inequality for product states is violated, but this violation is weak, in the sense that it can be achieved
with m-qubit entanglement. Now, for MQSS to work, ρ must be ”close” to |GHZM 〉, that is, must exhibit
”strong” M-qubit entanglement. Thus in all that follows we shall say that a M-qubit state ρ violates the
MKI if the violation is higher than the one that could be achieved with M-1 qubits, that is, if 〈BM 〉ρ > 2M2 .
4.2 Violation of MKI in NQSS
We consider the state that is generated in an eavesdropping scenario on NQSS. As usual, Alice is the sender.
Some of the receivers would like to retrieve Alice’s message without the other n partners to know it; they
ask then Eve to spy on those lines. We call Bobs B1, ..., BN−n−1 the partners that collaborate with Eve, and
Charlies C1, ..., Cn those that are spied. In the quantum protocol, each partner has a qubit, so we consider
a system of N + 1 qubits. We write the Hilbert space as HAB ⊗ HC ⊗ HE . We have demonstrated in the
previous section that under Eve’s optimal attack the state shared by the N + 1 partners becomes (we drop
the subscript z)
|ΨNn〉 = 1√
2
(|0N−n〉|0n〉|0〉 + cosφ |1N−n〉|1n〉|0〉 + sinφ |1N−n〉|0n〉|1〉) . (12)
Let ρABC = ρa and ρABE = ρu be the density matrices of the authorized and of the unauthorized partners
that are derived from |ΨNn〉. We have Sa = maxa Tr(BN (a)ρa) and Su = maxa Tr(BN−n+1(a)ρu). In the
absence of a criterion like Horodeckis’ [13], it is difficult to perform the optimization that gives S, even for
the particular state that we consider. We found an explicit result when N and n have different parity, and
relied on numerical optimization for the other cases. These results are given in Appendix A. Within these
warnings, we can safely state that the following holds: in the NQSS protocol, whatever the number n of
honest partners that are eavesdropped by Eve:
Ia > Ib if and only if Sa > 2
N
2 ; (13)
and in this case Su < 2
N−n+1
2 . This is the exact analog of the result obtained for N = 2: in case of optimal
attack by Eve, the authorized partners have a higher information than the unauthorized ones if and only
if they violate the MKI. In other words, to within the warnings above, we have proved the Conjecture put
forward in a previous work [21].
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4.3 MKI and the structure of the Hilbert space
The main feature of the link between optimal eavesdropping and the violation of MKIs is that the authorized
partners violate the inequality if and only if the unauthorized partners don’t. Of course, it is trivial to loosen
this link: non-optimal attacks can easily be found in which neither set of partners violate an inequality. Thus
so far we have met only states of qubits characterized by the following property: if a set M of M qubits
violate a MKI, then all other sets of qubits having an overlap with M do not violate a MKI. A natural
question is: is this property true for all possible states of qubits? If the answer were positive, then for any
given state the violation of MKIs would define a unique partition of the set of qubits, into subsets of ”strongly
entangled” qubits. This would provide an astonishing link between the violation of MK inequalities and the
structure of the Hilbert space.
However, the answer to this question turns out to be negative. The simplest counterexample is provided by
a system of four qubits A,B,C and D, where it is possible that both triples (A,B,C) and (B,C,D) violate the
Mermin’s inequality. For example, for α ≈ 0.955, the state cosα(|0011〉 + |1100〉 + i|0101〉 + i|1010〉)/2 +
sinα(i|1001〉 + |1111〉)/√2 gives SABC = SBCD = 3, obviously higher than 2
√
2 which is the bound for a
three-qubit violation. We have found numerically several more examples in which a violation of MKIs by
two overlapping sets is allowed; these results are listed in Appendix B. Interestingly, there are also some
cases in which a double violation is not possible: thus there is indeed a link between the violation of MKIs
and the structure of the Hilbert space, although this link may be difficult to unravel. Possibly a stronger
link could be found by using more general inequalities.
In the meantime, the link between violation of MKI and security is strengthened by these remarks. In fact,
even though there exist states in the Hilbert space that would allow double violations of MKI, these states
can never be produced in any eavesdropping scenario [21].
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a link between the security of some quantum key distribution protocols and the
violation of some Bell’s inequalities. Precisely: in a secret-sharing protocol, the authorized partners have
a higher mutual information than the unauthorized ones if and only if they violate a Mermin-Klyshko
inequality. Whether this result is valid for other protocols, or for other inequalities, is an open question
worth investigating.
All the protocols described in this paper can be implemented using qubits. It is a current field of investigation
whether higher security can be achieved using higher-dimensional quantum systems [22]. Now, for such
systems, no satisfactory Bell inequality has been found yet; the link with cryptography may provide a
pathway to some new advances in this direction.
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Appendix A
We want to calculate Sa = maxa Tr(BN (a)ρa) and Su = maxa Tr(BN−n+1(a)ρu), where ρa = ρABC and
ρu = ρABE derived from the state |ΨNn〉 defined in (12). We discuss first the calculation of Sa.
Let B = BN (a)⊗ 1E . Then we have Sa = maxa 〈ΨNn|B|ΨNn〉. Now:
〈ΨNn|B|ΨNn〉 = 1
2
[
〈0N |BN |0N〉+ cos2 φ 〈1N |BN |1N〉+ sin2 φ 〈1N−n0n|BN |1N−n0n〉 +
+ cosφ (〈1N |BN |0N 〉+ c.c.)
]
.
But 〈1N |BN |1N〉 = (−1)N〈0N |BN |0N〉 and 〈1N−n0n|BN |1N−n0n〉 = (−1)N−n〈0N |BN |0N 〉, as can be easily
verified from the definition of BN . Therefore
Sa = max
a
(
fNn(φ)B00(a) + cosφB10(a)
)
(14)
where B00 = 〈0N |BN |0N 〉, B10 = Re〈1N |BN |0N〉, and where the function fNn(φ) is positive and depends on
the parity of N and n. Before discussing it in detail let’s see why the calculation of Sa is not trivial. We
know that there are sets a of unit vectors that saturate the bound B10(a) = 2
N+1
2 ; but for these we find
B00(a) = 0. Similarly, the sets a that saturate the bound B00(a) = 2 give B10(a) = 0. Thus to calculate Sa
we cannot optimize both B00 and B10: we must know whether it is better to optimize one of the two and
letting the other go to zero, or if we must find an intermediate value. Numerical estimates suggest that the
first strategy is the good one. However, by considering all possible values of fNn(φ) we can get some more
insight
• For N odd and n even, fNn(φ) = 0. Consequently the maximization is immediate: Sa = 2N+12 cosφ,
that goes below the limit 2
N
2 precisely for φ = pi4 .
• For N even and n odd, fNn(φ) = cos2 φ. Therefore Sa ≤ cosφ maxa
(
B00(a) + B10(a)
)
. But since N
is even, B00(a) + B10(a) = 〈GHZ|BN (a)|GHZ〉, that can reach 2N+12 . Consequently the bound can be
achieved, and we have again Sa = 2
N+1
2 cosφ.
• For both N and n odd, fNn(φ) = sin2 φ; and for both N and n even, fNn(φ) = 1. For these cases, we
did not find any argument leading to a simple estimate of Sa. However, several numerical estimates
strongly suggest that Sa = max
[
2
N+1
2 cosφ , 2 fNn(φ)
]
. In particular, the boundary S = 2
N
2 is once
again crossed for φ = pi4 .
The same discussion can be made for Su, replacing φ by
pi
2 − φ, N by N ′ = N − n + 1 and n by n′ = 1.
Therefore n′ is always odd. If N and n have different parities, then N ′ is even, and we have certainly
10
Su = 2
N−n+1
2 sinφ. If N and n have the same parity, then N ′ is odd as n′, and we are left with numerical
arguments.
In conclusion, the condition for security (13) has been rigorously demonstrated for N and n of different parity.
Note that this case includes the case where n = N − 1, that is the case of an external Eve and no dishonest
Bob. For the cases whereN and n have the same parity, we did not find a conclusive demonstration. However,
both numerical arguments [23] and formal analogies (the structure of the states is identical) strongly suggest
that (13) holds in these cases too.
Appendix B
Consider a set K of k qubits, and let M and N be two different but overlapping subsets of K containing
respectively m and n qubits. For definiteness, take m ≤ n. For a given |Ψ〉 ∈ HK, we write ρN and ρM the
density matrices for the qubits in the two subsets obtained from |Ψ〉〈Ψ| by partial traces. We ask if it is
possible to find a state |Ψ〉 ∈ HK such that
SN = max
a
Tr
(
ρN Bn(a)
)
> 2
n
2 and SM = max
A
Tr
(
ρM Bm(A)
)
> 2
m
2
where a and A are sets of, respectively, 2n and 2m unit vectors. To tackle this question, we define the
observable
Vknm = Bn(a)⊗ 1 k−n + 2n−m2 1 k−m ⊗ Bm(A) .
The computer program maximizes the highest eigenvalue of Vknm over all possible choices of a and A. If the
highest eigenvalue does not exceed 2× 2n/2, then it is impossible to find a state that allows both SN > 2n/2
and SM > 2m/2. The results of the numerical calculations that we performed are listed here (for clarity, we
print in boldface the common qubits):
• max(SAB + SAC) = 4: double violation impossible (Theorem 1 in [21]).
• max(SABC + SADE) = 4
√
2: impossible (Theorem 2 in [21]).
• max(SABC +SABD) = 6.0945 > 4
√
2: possible (Theorem 3 in [21]; see main text for a state that gives
a double violation).
• max(SABC +
√
2SAD) = 4
√
2: impossible.
• max(SABC +
√
2SAB) = 6.9282 > 4
√
2: possible, e.g. for the state 1√
2
(|000〉+cosα|111〉+sinα|110〉),
α ∈]0, pi2 [.
• max(SABCD + SADEF ) = 8: impossible.
• max(SABCD + SABEF ) = 8.612 > 8: possible.
• max(SABCD + SABCE) = 8: impossible.
• max(SABCD + 2SAE) = 8: impossible.
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• max(SABCD + 2SAB) = 9.7566 > 8: possible.
• max(SABCD +
√
2SAEF ) = 8: impossible.
• max(SABCD +
√
2SABE) = 6
√
2 > 8: possible.
• max(SABCD +
√
2SABC) = 9.6566 > 8: possible.
• max(SABCDE + SABFGH) = 12.088 > 8
√
2: possible.
• max(SABCDE + SABCFG) = 8
√
2: impossible.
• max(SABCDE + SABCDF ) = 8
√
2: impossible.
• max(SABCDE + 2SABF ) = 12.18 > 8
√
2: possible.
In these examples, double violations appear to be possible when one set is completely contained into the
other one i.e. M⊂ N , or when Card(M∩N ) = 2. Of course, it is difficult to guess general rules from these
observations, since we have explored only the cases n,m = 2, 3, 4 and some cases with n,m = 5.
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Figure 1: Bell parameter S and mutual information I for the two-partners QKD protocol BB84. The security
criterion (1) is satisfied if and only if SAB > 2.
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